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BLAMING AGAMEMNON 
MORAL CONFLICT AND THE FIRST CHORAL SEQUENCE 
OF AESCHYLUS' AGAMEMNON 
John Jackson and Marius Vennaak, Rhodes University; Grahamstownl 
Consider the following questions: is moral value subject to luck?2 How should we understand 
and cope with moral conflict?3 What do lines 40-263 of Aeschylus' Agamemnon mean, and why 
do the Chorus sing them? Martha Nussbaum in her recent book4 answers these questions and 
sees a deep connection between them. The sub-title of her book is "Luck and Ethics in Greek 
philosophy and tragedy" and in Chapter 2 she argues that the first choral sequence of Ag. 
answers the second question and gives a partial answer to the first. She also claims that 
Aeschylus has been misunderstood because of misguided modem philosophical assumptions 
concerning the two questions. 
On the whole moral philosophers have taken moral value to be immune to luck. The goodness of 
the moral person cannot be destroyed by what just happens to him. Nussbaum takes up a 
suggestion by Bernard Williams that: 
A deeper sense of exposure to fortune is expressed ... in Greek literature, above all 
in tragedy. There the repeated references to the insecurity of happiness get their 
force from the fact that the characters are displayed as having responsibilities, or 
pride, or needs, on a scale which lays them open to disaster in corresponding 
measure, and that they encounter disaster in full consciousness. 5 
She argues that tragedy correctly shows that not only human happiness but moral goodness itself 
is subject to luck, tuche. Moreover, goodness is valuable precisely because it is fragile. One 
way in which moral bad luck impinges on our lives is in the fonn of moral conflict. Philosophers 
have denied too, in the face of common sense, that conflict is possible:. Real moral conflict 
cannot occur, since moral principles cannot by definition conflict; and apparent conflict can be 
completely resolved by rational moral thought, leaving the subsequent action morally correct 





Greek tragedy shows good people being ruined because of things that just happen 
to them, things that they do not control. .... But the tragedies also show us, and dwell 
upon, another more intractable sort of case - one which has come to be called, as a 
result, the situation of "tragic conflict". In such cases we see a wrong action 
We would like to thank our colleague, Mrs Brenda Bell, for her helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper. 
Two papers that opened the modem debate in moral philosophy on this issue are: B. Williams, 
"Moral luck", in Moral Luck (Cambridge 1981); and T. Nagel, "Moral Luck", in Moral questions 
(Cambridge 1979). See also A. Kenny, "Aristotle on moral luck", in The heritage of wisdom (Oxford 
1987). 
C.W. Gowans (ed.), Moral dilemrruJS (New York 1987) is a useful introduction to recent 
philosophical discussion of this issue. 
M. Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness. (Cambridge 1986). 




committed without any direct physical compulsion and in full knowledge of its 
nature, by a person whose ethical character would otherwise dispose him to reject 
the act. The constraint comes from the presence of circumstances thai prevent the 
adequate fulfillment of two valid ethical claims. 
She has the following kind of case in mind: Someone wants or has reason to do A and wants or 
has reason to do B, but cannot do both, either because doing A is just doing not-B or because 
some contingent circumstance makes the alternatives incompatible.6 Agamemnon faces such a 
dilemma at Aulis. She objects to the philosophical understanding of such cases, because the 
theory distorts our intuitive experience: we just do not respond to conflicts as puzzles for which 
we have to fmd the right answers, but as situations where we have to do evil. 
The debate about the proper understanding of moral conflict is the key to Nussbaum's reading of 
the first choral sequence. In this paper we avoid this issue to concentrate on the question whether 
her interpretation of the Aeschylean text is plausible. 
Let us discuss the main points of her interpretation first: 
(1} The Chorus expresses Aeschylus' own view. 
Nussbaum does not say this directly, but expressions such as "what he has put before us", 
"Aeschylus has indicated" and "he suggests" (1986:49-50) imply a tendency to equate the 
Chorus' view with that of Aeschylus. 
(2} The Chorus expresses a consistent view of the nature of Agamemnon's conflict. 
Nussbaum (1986:33) sees hertask as follows: 
The sacrifice of Iphigenia is regarded by the Chorus as necessary; but they also 
blame Agamemnon. Critics have usually explained away either the necessity or the 
blame, feeling that these must be incompatible .... It is, however, possible to arrive 
at a coherent understanding of both aspects of the situation, if only we look more 
precisely at the nature and genesis of this necessity and also at what the Chorus 
finds blameworthy in the conduct of their chief. 
(3} Agamemnon's conflict is necessary in the sense that two equally valid moral claims 
conflict, but its origin is contingent in the sense that this does not come about through any 
wrongdoing on his part. 
According to Nussbaum (1986:33-34), the Chorus is confident that the command of Zeus to 
pursue the Trojan expedition is just. She relies on Ag. 55-66 and a remark about the Trojans in 
the first stasimon. She finds it significant that the Chorus does not question or even try to justify 
Artemis' intervention. 
6 This rough definition covers cases ranging from the trivial to the tragic. Nussbaum (1986:27) gives a 
loose set of criteria for serious conflict. The values involved must be centrnl to our and the person's 
conception of the good; sometimes harm. is done to other people; sometimes the harm done is 
irreparable; sometimes the conflict requires the person to act against and not merely neglect a desired 
project; etc. Nussbaum does not distinguish sharply between moral and other values, since the Greek 
texts don't, and since it would beg the question. 
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Whether we are to infer that her anger is caused by her general pro-Trojan 
sympathies or by her horror, as protector of the young, at the impt:nding slaughter 
of Trojan innocents, the force of Aeschylus's omission of a personal offence is to 
emphasize the contingent and external origin of Agamemnon's dreadful dilemma 
(Nussbaum 1986:33-34). 
Nussbaum does not ignore the background family guilt of the House of Atreus, but argues that 
reference to this is not sufficient to explain how the guilt enters Agamemnon's life. This guilt is 
attached to him by the dilemma which contingently confronts him, and which offers no guilt-free 
course of action. 
It is important that the necessity of the conflict does not eliminate Agamemnon's freedom. All 
action is the outcome of choice (freedom) within constraint (necessity). Agamemnon acts freely 
within the very tight constraints of the dilemma. He sees his options clearly, reacts with anger 
and grief (203-204), since he understands that neither option is without evil (206-213), makes up 
his mind (this process is veiled in Ag.), and decides to sacrifice Iphigeneia. 
( 4) Agamemnon makes the right decision. 
Agamemnon's decision is correct both as far as the consequences are concerned (if he does not 
sacrifice, everyone will die) and for reasons of piety (the pressing claims of Zeus and Artemis). 
Nussbaum quotes evidence that this is Agamemnon's (212) and the Chorus' view (188-190) of 
the consequences; that the divine commands are just, has already been established. 
(5) The Chorus blames Agamemnon for his emotional response to his decision and action. 
What the Chorus find blameworthy in Agamemnon is that he becomes a willing victim of his 
own bad luck. It is not so much what he does, as the way he does it. He~ adjusts his emotional 
response too glibly. Before the decision he saw the evil of both alternatives; after taking the right 
decision he suppresses its horror. For Nussbaum this crucial transformation is revealed in lines 
214-217, which she translates: 
For it is right and holy (themis) that I should desire with exceedingly impassioned 
passion (orgai periorgos epithumein) the sacrifice staying the winds, the maiden's 
blood. May all tum out well. (Nussbaum 1986:35) 
She reads this as an expression of "a peculiar optimism". The correctness of the decision seems 
to justify both his action and his emotion. The Chorus blame him for this. 
And when he had slipped his neck through the yoke-strap of necessity, blowing his 
mind in an impious change of direction, from the moment he changed his mind and 
turned to think the all-daring. For men are made bold by base-counselling wretched 
madness. He dared (etla) to become the sacrificer of his daughter. (219-225) 
This is perhaps the most striking feature of Nussbaum's interpretation: he1r understanding of why 
the Chorus blame Agamemnon. It requires that the Chorus take the emotions to play a rational 
and cognitive role. Nussbaum develops such an account of the emotions at length in Chapters 9 
and 10. She attributes it to Aristotle, and prefers it to standard philosophical views of the 
emotions as irrational and involuntary. A bonus of the Aristotelian account of the emotions is 
that it allows Nussbaum to make good sense of a notoriously difficult passage later in Ag., 799-




(6) The Chorus's own emotional response is an illustration of a more adequate response to 
conflict. 
The Chorus contrast their own response to the sacrifice with Agamemnon's ruthless performance 
of the act. In their description they movingly pick out the pitiful and horrible details, to which he 
is blind. Agamemnon never shows remorse; the Chorus have been racked by remorse during the 
intervening ten years ("the painful memory of pain drips, instead of sleep, before the hean". as 
Nussbaum translates lines 179-180). This seems to be the difference between a moral and a 
blamewonhy response to conflict. There is another difference as well: the Chorus' response leads 
to moral progress, wisdom; the other to punishment and death. Nussbaum (1986:45) connects 
this with the oft-repeated pathei mathos maxim: 
But we must now add, with the Agamemnon chorus, that the experience of conflict 
can also be a time of learning and development. The deep meaning of the proverbial 
pathei mathos ... is that hard cases like these, if one allows oneself really to see and 
to experience them, may bring an increase in self-knowledge and knowledge of the 
world. An honest effon to do justice to all aspects of a hard case, seeing and feeling 
it in all its conflicting many-sideness, could enrich future deliberative efforts. 
So much, then, for Nussbaum's interpretation of the first choral sequence of Ag. While it may 
be attractive and thought-provoking as an account of the experience of moral conflict, it poses 
some problems as a reading of Aeschylus. 
Let us begin with the question of the identity and role of the Chorus. One cannot assume (as 
Nussbaum does, point 1) that they are the spokesmen of Aeschylus himself." Would the same 
apply to the Chorus of Eum. i.e. the Erinyes? Surely not!1 Who are the Chorus of Ag.? Early in 
the play (72f.) they are identified as the elders of Argos, but they also at times represent the 
following: 
Observers at Aulis: 
The words "what happened thereafter I neither saw nor mention" (248)8 not only express 
horror at the deed, but may also remind the audience that the elders were not actually 
present. 
Greek soldiers at Troy: 
The Chorus graphically express the hatred felt by the soldiers for the land in which so 
many of them lie buried (454-455).9 Although the third person is used, this is the soldiers' 





The Chorus movingly describe Menelaus' sense ofloss at Helen's depanure (410-426). 
For a fuller discussion of the identity of the Chorus see Maurice Pope, "Merciful heavens", JHS 94 
(1974) 112-113. 
Unless otherwise indicated, from now on we use our own translations of the passages quoted, 
following the text of Denys Page (Oxford 1972). 
The conciseness of echthra d•eclumtas ekrupsen almost defies translation. 
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The community as a whole: 
Even more eloquently they describe the terrible and permanent losses experienced by 
many families and express the anger of the community (427-474). 
Agamemnon himself: 
The relevant lines are 206-216. 
To expect a single consistent view from such spokesmen as these (who represent various groups 
and individuals) is unreasonable (pace Nussbaum, point 2). Indeed one: cannot always expect 
this even when they are simply being the old men of Argos. For example, when the death cries 
of Agamemnon are heard, individual members are at variance with one another about what 
action to take (1346f.). We suggest that the only reason Nussbaum expects the Chorus to be 
consistent is that she assumes that they express a specific viewpoint viz. that of Aeschylus. 
With Nussbaum's third and fourth points we are in agreement. 
But what of her view (point 5) that the Chorus blame Agamemnon for his emotional response to 
the sacrifice? With this part of her interpretation we have the most difficulty. Certainly, several 
of the terms used are condemnatory, especially dussebe (219) anagnon and anieron (220) 
(which all imply an offence against the gods). But in the previous strophe it is clear that they are 
aware of his awful dilemma, and from this awareness their sympathy <:ould be inferred (205-
214). 
What should one make of this? Perhaps they are expressing the responses of different people 
who witnessed the sacrifice: some were sympathetic, others blamed Agamemnon. But this 
interpretation may be rather superficial. Nussbaum claims that the Ohorus agree with what 
Agamemnon does, but blame him for his emotional response: how he does it Is this the only 
explanation of the apparent inconsistency, or even the most plausible one:? Following Dover, we 
would argue that the Chorus respond to the sacrifice both as an action (what is intentionally 
done) and as an event (what simply happens). They acknowledge the correctness of the action, 
but the intrinsic evil of the event elicits from them an intense emotional reaction, which accounts 
for the strong condemnatory language which they apply to Agamemnon. This might not be a 
fully rational response, but it is a natural one: what they describe here is their (or the observers') 
reaction at the time, not their cool assessment after ten intervening years. As Dover remarks, 
"The Chorus describes Agamemnon's dilemma fairly, then reacts to tl1e outcome as men do 
react".to Nussbaum's interpretation is ingenious, but it is not called for unless one assumes 
consistency on the part of the Chorus. 
As for the apparent transformation of Agamemnon's character (214-217) and his "peculiar 
optimism", Nussbaum may have misunderstood the mood of the words "May all tum out well" 
(her translation of eu gar eii! (216)). Throughout Ag. there are several other prayers for 
deliverance. Whenever this motif occurs, the mood of the speakers is at best one of anxiety (e.g. 
the Watchman 1, 19-20), at worst one of sheer despair (e.g. the Chorus, 998). 11 In fact it is only 
10 
II 
The Greeks (Oxford 1980) 92; for a fuller account of the Chorus' reaction, see "Some neglecled 
aspects of Agamemnon's dilemma", JHS 93 (1973) 58-69. 
See also 121 (repeated in 138, 159), sung by the Chorus, and the pathetic prayer of Cassandra in 
1291-1294. The only person who appears to make this kind of prayer with any feeling of confidence 
is Clytaemnestra: see 349 and possibly 973-974. 
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at the end of Eum. that such a prayer can be uttered with any real feeling of confidence (974-
975, 1033-1047). From a dramatic point of view it makes beuer sense to associate the words eu 
gar eie with pessimism rather than optimism.t2 
On the interpretation (in more general terms) of lines 214-217, a passage from Cho. (827-830) 
may be enlightening. There Orestes is given the following encouragement: 
Be bold when your time comes to act 
And when she cries "Child", 
Shout "Father!" 
And carry out the blameless destruction. 
The Chorus do not name Iphigeneia, but the verbal similarities with Ag. 228f. are so striking 
that the audience are surely meant to be aware of parallels between Agamemnon's situation and 
Orestes'.l3 Agamemnon has been (virtually) ordered by Artemis to kill his daughter; Orestes has 
been (explicitly) ordered by Apollo to kill his mother (Cho. 558-559, 900-902; Eum. 64-84).14 
(Is it mere coincidence that these deities are twins?) In both cases failure to do the deed would 
involve disobedience to Zeus:IS in the case of Agamemnon this is obvious; in the case of 
Orestes, less so, at least for the time being, but in the last play it is made clear that Apollo's 
action is strongly linked with Zeus (Eum. 616-621).16 · 
Of course an important difference is the moral position of the victims: Iphigeneia is innocent; 
Clytaemnestra guilty. But perhaps according to Nussbaum's interpretation, Orestes ought to feel 
revulsion or remorse at his own deed simply because Oytaemnestra is his mother, and without 
reference to what she has done. For a time he does hesitate. Then Pylades, whose silence up to 
now (900) must have puzzled the audience, speaks his only lines in the play, in which he 
reminds Orestes of Apollo's instructions. These three lines have a decisive effect not only on the 
action of the play, but also on Orestes' character. As happened to his father, Orestes becomes 
brutal. The deed has to be done -dire punishment is threatened if it is not (Cho. 276-284, Eum. 
465-468) - and it can only be done if he forces himself to be different from his normal self, or to 
become (in colloquial terms) a "monster". Is not Agamemnon in a similar position? Is it too 
much to suggest that far from exhibiting an inadequate emotional response (Nussbaum, point 5), 
Agamemnon (like Orestes), in order to do the deed, has to force himself to be a "monster" 
precisely because he is a naturally sensitive person? Perhaps he finds it necessary to assume a 
"willing boldness of temper" (as Nussbaum translates tharsos hekousion [803]). 
However, Nussbaum's interpretation of this phrase is problematic. She may be right to accept the 
reading hekousion and to link the phrase with Agamemnon rather than Helen, but there is no 
reason to suppose that the Chorus are referring here specifically to the Aulis episode. Rather 
their criticism is that lives have been lost - hence the plural andrasi. That the men at Aulis 






On the pessimistic tone of the hymn to Zeus, see Pope art. cit. l07f. W.B. Stanford refers to 
Agamen;non's prayer as "pathetically futile" (Greek tragedy and the emotions [London etc. 1983] 
128). 
/itas .... patroious (Ag. 228), '' tekrwn", "ergoi patros" ( C lw. 829). For another striking parallel, see Ag. 
154-155 (Menis tekrwpoirws) and Clw. 648-651 (tekrwn d·epeispherei domois ... Erinys). On the 
importance of parallels in general between these two plays, see A.F. Garvie, Aeschylus Clweplwri 
(Oxford 1987) (2nd. ed.) xxxvf. 
Cf. Eum. 200-207,276-285,578-579,593-596. 
Garvie (op. cit. xxxi) points out that it was also the will of the underworld powers and dead 
Agamemnon that Clytaemnestra should be punished. On the power that dead Agamemnon is seen (at 




die. The phrase andrasi thneiskousi refers more naturally to the men who died at Troy: the 
community's sense of outrage at the loss there of so many lives is strongly emphasised elsewhere 
in the play (see above). 
There seems, then, to be little evidence that the Chorus (or anyone else besides Oytaemnestra) 
blame Agamemnon for his emotional response to the sacrifice of lphigene:ia. 
Nor is there evidence to suggest (as Nussbaum does, point 6, with reference to lines 179-180) 
that the Chorus have felt remorse during the intervening ten years or that they have made 
progress in moral terms. The point here is likely to be a more general one:: all-powerful Zeus has 
ordained the doctrine of pathei mathos. At this stage the precise mealfling of this strophe is 
cryptic: perhaps Aeschylus does not expect the audience to grasp it fuUy until the end of the 
trilogy. 
Certain elements are ignored by Nussbaum: 
Good news from Calchas (line 156): 
Amidst the gloom and horror at Aulis, one is inclined to forget that much of Calchas' message 
was positive: "with many good things" (156).17 Doubtless one of those "good things'~ was the 
expectation of victory at Troy. For Agamemnon this would have meant that the expedition 
ordained by Zeus must succeed at all costs - quite literally.18 What this implies is that the 
dilemma was not quite as problematic for Agamemnon as one might imagine. 
"Another woman" (lines 225-6): 
An important motif in Ag. is that the Trojan war was conducted for the sake of "another 
woman" or a "promiscuous woman" - i.e. Helen.19 Its prominence in lines 225-226 may have the 
effect of focusing the audience's attention not only on Agamemnon's "guilt" (which is still not 
clear), but also on Helen's "guilt" (which is obvious). 
Subsequent references in the Oresteia to lphigeneia: 
Nothing more is said about Iphigeneia in Ag. until lines 1415f. The speaker is Oytaemnestra, 
who cites the sacrifice of her daughter as her chief motive for murdering Agamemnon. Although 
she refers to the episode three times and in strong terms, what she says is not necessarily 
intended by the playwright to increase the audience's sense of Agamemnon's guilt There is an 
interesting parallel between lines 228-237 and 1415f., especially in tenus of the motif of killing 
an animal, but the sarcasm and blasphemy of Oytaemnestra's remark 1that he did the deed "to 
charm away the gales of Thrace" (1418) belie any serious attempt by her to understand 
Agamemnon's dilemma. Compare her tasteless description of the affectionate greeting between 




xun me galois agathois. 
Cf. the point made by D.H. Roberts (with reference 10 Apollo) that an oracle must ~ fulfilled: 
"Sometimes (as in the Oresteia) ... the fulfillment of an oracle ... appears not so much inevitable as 
necessary: something for which both gods and mortals are responsible and which both must desire". 
(Apollo and his oracle in the Oresteia, Hypomnemata 78 [Gottingen 1984] 121.) 
The description varies from one reference 10 another. See also 62, 448, 800 (where she is named), 
823, as well as the passages 404-419,681-749. 
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commentator on Agamemnon's guilt is seriously undermined by her adultery with Aegisthus20 
and the fact (which emerges in Cho. 135-136) that she and Aegisthus have deprived Orestes of 
what is rightfully his. 
What may be particularly significant is the lack of any mention of Iphigeneia by the Chorus. If 
the Chorus (all or part thereof) were strongly convinced of Agamemnon's guilt at Aulis, would 
they not make some reference to it - especially now that the "silence" which has pervaded the 
play has been broken?21 It is tempting to suggest that Aeschylus has surprised us (i.e. the 
audience) by subtly playing on our expectations: a superficial hearing of lines 218f. may prompt 
some sense of Agamemnon's guilt at Aulis, and so we expect an unequivocal condemnation of 
him at the end of the first play. This is precisely what does not happen, and so we are 
compelled to rethink this complex issue. 
The only reference to Iphigeneia in the rest of the trilogy occurs in Cho. 242. Nothing is said or 
implied about the morality of the sacrifice. And surprisingly, in the last play, the Erinyes (who 
take Clytaemnestra's side) make no reference to Iphigeneia: although they normally punish the 
shedding of kindred blood (Eum. 212), their only concern here is one particular version of it: 
matricide (passim). 
What all this suggests is that Nussbaum has exaggerated the dramatic importance of 
Agamemnon's dilemma at Aulis. 
A general problem with Nussbaum's interpretation is that it imposes on the play an 
understanding of dike ("justice") which is anachronistic. And yet throughout the Dresteia there 
are several features of dike which one cannot ignore, even though to many 20th century minds 








Guilt can be inherited through a curse on a family. 
The dike that ultimately prevails in the Oresteia is strongly linked with Zeus' 
supremacy, a supremacy which has come about not only through coercion (e.g. Eum. 
973f.) but also through brute force, as the audience are reminded during the hymn to Zeus 
which occurs in the middle of the account ofCalchas' prophecy (Ag. 167-175). 
Both Apollo and Athene help to secure Orestes' acquittal by associating themselves with 
the dike of Zeus22 in ways that from a moral or even logical point of view a modem 
audience would find highly unsatisfactory: Athene, whose casting vote as presiding judge 
is crucial, remarks (Eum. 736f.) that she herself had no mother and prefers male to female. 
Apollo refers (657-666) to the myth about the mutual challenge of Zeus and Hera that 
each should produce a child unaided: Athene's presence is upheld as evidence of Zeus' 
success, but Hera's equally great success in producing Hephaestus is ignored (very 
convenient! y ). 
Apart from Athene, the jury votes in equal numbers for acquittal and condemnation. What 
this means is that much importance is still attached to the retributive type of justice 
represented by the Erin yes. And Athene herself in her words of assurance to them (804) 
appears to give them more prominence in human society than they might have had before. 
The infidelity of Agamemnon, as implied. by the presence of Cassandra, would probably not have 
worried the contemporary audience very much! 
See 36-39, 248, 263 and 548. Note also the long silence of Cassandra (783-1072) and the "eloquent" 
silence of Iphigeneia (239-247). 
Apollo and Zeus: 616, cf. 713-714; Athene and Zeus: 973-975. 
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(e) Group interests are important, more so than Nussbaum may recognise. Throughout her 
discussion she places great emphasis on Agamemnon as an individual. However both sons 
of Atreus are described as intensely upset by Calchas' message (Ag. 203-204). And 
whatever the correct reading of line 216 may be,23 there is nothing in the text to suggest 
that epithumein should be translated as "I should desire". As for the "battle-loving 
leaders" (philomachoi brabes) who remain unmoved by Iphigeneia's supplications (228f.), 
Menelaus is likely to be one of them, and possibly there are others. In lines 239-240 the 
phrase "each of the sacrificers" (hekaston thuteron) implies that Agamemnon is not the 
only target of Iphigeneia's "eye's piteous dart" (239-240). This shows that others besides 
Agamemnon were involved in the dilemma at Aulis. No doubt it would have been the 
view of the contemporary audience that the interests of the group should prevail over 
those of an individuai.24 
But the question of Agamemnon's guilt still needs to be answered. Apart from the curse, is there 
any other way in which guilt enters his life (Nussbaum, point 3)? Some commentators have 
suggested that his action of stepping on carpets fit only for the gods is an act of hybris (944f.). 
In a sense it is, but what may be more significant in terms of his character is that he allows 
Clytaemnestra to persuade him to do something against his better judgement.25 A much more 
important example of hybris is his excessive punishment of Troy. The first signs of this come 
from a speech by Clytaemnestra (320f., esp. 330-347). Of course, in more ways than one, she 
has an axe to grind, and she would probably welcome these additional justifications of her 
intended murder. However, the audience would probably remember (from the post-Homeric 
epics) that acts of hybris such as mentioned by her did take place at Troy.26 These impressions 
are strongly confirmed by the Herald's speech {503f.). He has come ostensibly to tell the good 
news of Troy's capture, yet he lays far more stress on negative aspects of the war, notably the 
excessiveness of the punishment: "Double was the penalty paid by the sons of Priam for their 
failings" (537). Perhaps unwittingly Agamemnon himself refers to the: excessiveness of it all 
(827-828): 
A flesh-eating lion leapt over the walls 
And licked the blood of kings until he was satisfied. 
All these references should be seen against the background of the Chorus' words (364f.): 
(Zeus) for a long time stretched the bow, 
So that the arrow should not fall at random 
Either short of the mark or beyond the stars. 
The point here is not only that Zeus ordained the punitive expedition, but that he intended the 
punishment to strike the mean between inadequacy and excess. Agamemnon has failed through 
being guilty of excess. There is little doubt that the point would have been appreciated by the 
contemporary audience: on the Acropolis, towering above the theatre of the Dionysus, were grim 
reminders of excessive action taken by the Persians twenty years earlier; and a generation later a 





periorgos epithumein (MSS) or periorgoi s<ph>• (Page). See Nussbaum, note 36. 
See Dover art. cit. 66, Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle, (Oxford 1974) 
292f. 
See H. Lloyd-Jones, (Aeschylus : Oresteia, Agamemnon (translated with notes) (London 1982) ad 
loc. 
See Lloyd-Jones op. cit. ad /oc. 
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version of the Mytilenean debate (3.37-48). Perhaps the ultimate tragedy of Agamemnon is that 
in moral terms he succeeds in his difficult dilemma at Aulis but fails in his more straightforward 
task at Troy, for ironically he becomes guilty of the very crime for which his expedition has 
attempted to punish Paris: hybris. 
Many aspects of the Oresteia might disappoint those modem readers who expect to find a 
subtle and sophisticated view of moral issues, such as is presented by Nussbaum. Even so, the 
contemporary audience would have found much in the trilogy to be thought-provoking and 
innovative. It might have left some problems unresolved, but at least it would have conveyed to 
the audience the notion that moral issues - such as the dilemma at Aulis - could be complex. And 
the idea ofending the story in Athens and involving the Areopagite jury cannot have failed to 
startle the audience who witnessed the first production in 458, particularly since it was only three 
years previously that the Areopagus had been deprived of many of its judicial functions during 
the reforms by Pericles and Ephialtes. What is more, the Areopagus hill was close by and would 
have been clearly seen during the procession from the agora just before the trilogy began. 
Perhaps what Aeschylus was trying to say to his fellow countrymen through his bold adaptation 
of a well-known story of long ago and the astonishing richness of his language, was that they 
should think about . dike in at least some of its complexities and take an active part in promoting 
it, not only in their personal lives but more importantly in the life of the community. 
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